scholars who, in his eyes, belong to the very few who treat hagiographical material properly-in other words, those who actually work as historians. But the question is not who we are and what institutional environment we work in, but rather we work and we publish concerning various facets of humankind's past. The problem is that the heterogeneous mixture of historical data, intellectual speculation and, often, mere intuition, is often absorbed uncritically and wholly as established facts by an unprepared audience. a chapter on the development of communitarian religion at the end of work on Chinese religion. 8 In that study, I questioned the widespread and conformist view that Zhang Lu's (Hanzhong , in present-day Shaanxi) had been 'theocratic'. My arguments were twofold. First, the available sources show clearly that contemporary historiographers did not condemn Zhang Lu for being at the head of a 'religious' polity. Rather, they criticised him for remaining an independent cliquish leader once his takeover had been recognised by the throne instead of becoming the docile local representative of a centralised imperial state, as he had been expected to do. Second, it seemed irrelevant to single out as 'theocratic' a polity that was located in a cultural area where political power had long been understood as being of transcendental origin.
9 Therefore, even though Zhang Lu's leadership and the Emperor's rule obviously differed in a number of respects (territorial expanse, lineage and prestige, to name the most obvious ones), they certainly were not was just another case of 'overinterpretation'.
More recently, my study of a cluster of fragments from a textual corpus more or less contemporaneous with the Later Han dynasty and known in Western academia as Weft ( ) writings or 'Confucian Apocrypha' 8 After the short-lived Qin parts of what is now central and eastern China for nearly four and a half centuries. To some extent, it may be compared to the Roman Empire. After Wang Mang's (46 BCE-23 CE) failed attempt at founding a new dynasty at the beginning of our era (9-23), the second half of that period is known as the Later Han As a side remark to be further discussed elsewhere, one may argue that 'ecclesiocracy' would have been perhaps more appropriate than 'theocracy' here.
provided further evidence in support of the latter argument. In Han times, debates on dynastic legitimacy, the narratives shaping the origin of supreme authority in the human realm, and the propaganda used by contestants for imperial power, all revolved around a shared assumption that the roots and nature of sovereignty transcend the sphere of human agency.
11 Not only Zhang Lu, whose venture met with some success, but also any would-be emperor had to partake of the same ideological background, regardless of variations in the paraphernalia exhibited to sustain his contention, from pseudo-imperial personal titles to pompous reign names and counterfeit regalia. Naturally, unsuccessful candidates ended up being 'executed' ( )-in most cases 'beheaded' ( )-either for lese-majesty or disruption of public order, if not both. Such was certainly the case with a certain Dai Yi from the princedom of Pei (in present-day Anhui), who was executed in 166.
12
Dai Yi met a judicial death not because the 'symbolic writings' ( ) engraved on the gold seal he had found proved to be of his own
Most High August One ( ), evidently a pseudoimperial title, for which he was immediately charged with the crime of high treason. 13 This second case of overinterpretation concerning the cause of Dai cases exemplify how some contemporary publications on Chinese history easily misinterpret 'religious' data documented in primary sources by overstressing them. I place the adjective between quotation marks, because the meaning and use of the Western concept of 'religion' in a Chinese setting seems to be a pending issue, which cannot be satisfyingly 11 Espesset, 'Epiphanies of Sovereignty '. 12 This is according to the (Book of the Later Han), completed in 445 by Fan Ye (398-445), 7.316. That source postdates Dai Yi's execution by about three centuries. Present-day publications commonly disregard such a diachronic distance and treat standard histories as if they were contemporaneous with the events they report. (Nevertheless, standard histories do also contain many citations of supposedly original material, such as edicts, policy proposals, responses to the throne and so forth.) In addition, standard histories are known to be biased, and the political background to their compilation should be kept in mind; see Gardiner, 'Standard Histories, Han to Sui': 42-52. For a case study falling within the scope of this article, see Chaussende, 'Un historien sur le banc des accusés'.
13 As I argued in my dealt with here. 14 Most scholars' tacit understanding of 'religion' seems to realising that any criterion looses pertinence in proportion to the broadening of its application, only to disappear the very moment it becomes universal.
Resistance in the Historiography of Early Medieval China
This article endeavours to further document my position by surveying a cluster of what may tentatively be called instances of 'local resistance' to the centralised imperial authorities of early medieval China. 15 The common feature of the following anecdotes is that most of the agents of 'resistance' described-whether individual leaders, unnamed subordinates, anonymous masses of followers, or even speech, teachings and practices-were characterised by the Chinese historiographers as being 'deviant' ( ). This term, to which the last section of this essay will return, covers quite to point to 'religious' motives at the basis of the social phenomena under consideration.
16 Each anecdote will be concluded by a short summing-up of the data relevant for our purpose.
'religions in cultures that lack an analogous vocabulary': 319. To my knowledge, and as far as Taoism is concerned, only Raz, : 18-21, has attempted to based on a variable combination of criteria and acknowledging diversity, in contrast to the 15 Due to space constraints, I have included only a selection of anecdotes covering, conventionally, the third to sixth centuries. (Borrowing from Western terminology, Chinese historiography now distinguishes an 'early medieval era', third to sixth centuries, and a still debated, as well as the relevance of this terminology to Chinese history.) The innumerable instances of 'rebellion' ( ) and 'disorder' ( ) recorded in the relevant standard histories would require book-length coverage.
16 Such seems to be the assumption behind the series of papers by Miyakawa Hisayuki of the compounds and as 'sorcery' and 'wizard bandit', respectively, see Miura, ' 23 To our frustration perhaps, the relevant historiographical source does not specify the contents of that prophecy. 24 Fang, 25 Here again, the historiographical source does not report the contents of that prophecy.
26 Fang, more than three centuries. The date of these events is supplied by a much later source, the Sima Guang this source is the earliest known chronological rewriting of historical data drawn from a wide array of sources; see Pulleyblank, 'Chinese Historical Criticism': 135-66. ). In this concluding case, the relevant data are planned rebellion and self-proclaimed kingship. 57 The Liu clan had ruled the Han dynasty; see n. 52 above. 58 Wei, , 32.463. Transcriptions in Li, , 49.1784. 59 The trick consisted in feeding the gullible large quantities of food seemingly cooked from small amounts of ingredients but in fact stealthily taken out of a cellar; see Li and Li, , 41.538, transcribed in Li, , 53.1925-26 . In addition to the serving of vegetarian food, early Buddhist 'fasting assemblies' included confession and the chanting La récitation des noms de "Buddha" en Chine et au Japon ': 252-53. Li and Li, , 8.296, 53.1925-26 .
Religious Interpretation and Its Limits
It would be dishonest to deny that, as in the anecdotes above, the information relevant to the study of Chinese religion and allowing for many transcultural comparisons. The problem is rather how we interpret some of these data to reconstruct early medieval religious history. As previously noted, all the anecdotes above are tagged by the occurrence of . But in the light of the variety of cases reviewed-charismatic rebels, impostors and schemers, plus self-proclaimed dukes, kings, emperors, restorers and religious reformers-'deviance' appears to be the word seems to denote the state of mind, induced by the pursuit of some superior end beyond looting or instigating disorder, of both the leader triggering social unrest and the body of people seduced into sharing that pursuit. It is doubtless that such a pursuit may have occasionally included 'religious' motives, but it is also doubtless that 'religion' covered only one facet of the relevant phenomena. 61 Factors to be kept in mind (yet not to be dwelled upon here) include the notion of 'opportunity', either created or seized. 62 somehow shared a 'Taoist' identity, to the point that, a few years ago, François Martin felt compelled to remark, not without some ingenuousness: 'One is surprised in fact by the great number of revolts which broke out in 61 As an example, Crowell, 'Social Unrest and Rebellion', has proposed a sixfold taxonomy including a single religious category: ( ) 'rebellions caused by natural disaster and famine'; ( ) 'protest against government oppression'; ( ) 'religious rebellion'; ( ) 'localist and separatist rebellion'; (e) 'ethnic disturbances'; and (f) 'bandits and pirates'. Crowell attacks upon the rulers by the ruled' (p. 322). He adds that the purpose of these categories is to 'clarify the most important forces that were at work' (p. 343), thereby suggesting that other factors may have existed behind those 'forces'. 62 Dull, 'Anti-Qin Rebels', shows the limits of the interpretation of the 'evil' Qin dynasty being overthrown by 'peasants', and proposes a convincing picture of the main contenders for the throne as political actors 'creating' or 'stealing opportunities', including for the purpose of 'vengeance', or trying to 'gain political or socio-political redemption '. character. This situation would later change with the progress of Buddhism, which did not provoke such movements'. 63 Quite the contrary, as some of the anecdotes suggest, Buddhists did inspire revolts, and perhaps more frequently than one would imagine.
64
Anna Seidel (1938-91) , chief among distinguished Sinologists, wrote
Laozi
. His second coming, during which he would manifest as a god and inaugurate an era of Great Peace ( ), was announced in the Taoist eschatological literature of the period; some sources even describe him as descending in the company of the messianic Buddha Mile (Maitreya). 65 That the many Li Hongs recorded in medieval historiography were historical manifestations of ambient apocalyptic beliefs is a sound theory, but no historian would neglect to counterbalance the importance of this religious drive with other probable economic and socio-political factors. And there is no proof that any of these Li Hongs belonged to the Way of the Li Clan (Li ), as Miyakawa presumed in the case of Li Tuo. 66 This tradition is too scarcely documented in primary sources to allow for anything more than conjectures, especially with respect to its possible relationship with other, better-known Taoist sects.
67
Taoist identity becomes even more blurred as we consider the other cases referred to in our survey. When not interpreted in Marxist-inspired terms by Chinese scholars as a 'peasant revolt' motivated by 'class struggle', 63 Martin, 'La rébellion de Sun En et Lu Hsün On est surpris en fait du grand nombre de révoltes qui ont éclaté en Chine au cours des IV e et V e siècles avec un caractère de tels mouvements.').
64 between 337 and 524, according to Seiwert, 'Traces of Zoroastrian': 32-34, gives a list of 13 movements spanning the years 471-614 and containing Buddhist elements, some of which, in his view, could actually point to Manichaeism. Interestingly for our purpose, Liu concedes that, in some cases, 'the link between the rebels' activities and Manichaeism is rather vague and cannot be regarded as established ' (p. 34) . 65 Seidel, 'The Image of the Perfect Ruler'. For 'Great Peace', see n. 81 below. On the messianic and millenarian facets of Maitreya, see the essays collected in Sponberg and Hardacre (eds), 66 Miyakawa, ' r 67 See Yamada, 'Ibun no bunka-shi': 347-62. Sun En's movement is usually presented as a 'Taoist rebellion'. In the sole exception to this representation that is known to me, Chi-tim Lai has analysed contemporaneous Taoist ideologies to conclude that the uprising 'was more likely provoked by the southerners' deeply felt grievances beliefs'. 68 In the anecdotes involving Sima Lun/Sun Xiu (case 1) and Li Tuo (case 3), isolated mentions of 'men of the Way' ( ) do not imply adherence to a denomination acknowledged by mainstream Taoism. In addition, the meaning of the compound evolved in the course the time the mid-seventh-century was put together. But throughout the Jin era, which witnessed the events described in both anecdotes, the expression still referred, in a classical sense, to anyone mastering a 'Way'-a secret expertise, a set of techniques or practicesbut was also used in reference to Buddhists. 69 The fact that elsewhere in the , as we have seen, Li Tuo is called a 'man of the arts' ( the part of the interpreter. Citing a classic study by the Academia Sinica historian Chen Yingke Miyakawa noted that a Buddhist encyclopaedia completed in 668, the (Fayuan zhulin ), refers to Lu Song as a -unquestionably a 'Taoist' at that time and in this context. 71 For one thing, the , whose completion predates that source by being a secular historical source, the is the work of Daoshi 72 It may be of primary importance for the study of seventh-century Buddhism, but, like most medieval Buddhist texts authored in China, it should not be used as an unprejudiced and historically reliable source, and even more so for the study of early medieval Taoism. Indeed, the mention of Lu Song 68 Lai, 'Daoism and Political Rebellion': 79. Yet one may wonder if the hidden motivation of the paper is not to partake in the construction of an idealised Taoist history purged from any antisocial manifestation. appears in a polemical chapter devoted to 'Confuting Perversity' ( ), in other words, to counter-attacking Taoism and anti-Buddhist propaganda. 73 Nonetheless, despite substantial grey areas and, in most cases, the paucity of our information, the anecdotes surveyed above do indeed provide the student of religions with a profusion of elements pointing to religious practices. It should be made clear, however, that none of these respect to Liu Lingzhu (case 11).
74 Mediums-in Chinese, and , sometimes rendered as 'shamans' in Western publications (whether we can speak of shamanism in Chinese context or not is another pending issue)-and spiritualism existed in China since the earliest ages of civilisation, but they progressively declined in status from elite circles to the lowest social strata, where they remained the target of ceaseless attacks by Taoists, Buddhists and the state alike.
75 Divination, prophecy and the interpretation of various phenomena as auspicious or inauspicious omens often appear to share a common conceptual background with Taoism, but they cannot be reduced to it.
76 Cults to immortals, classically represented as feathered beings, and the quest for long or inextinguishable life certainly have historical and ideological connections with Taoism, but any such cultural manifestation current, unless explicitly stated. 77 It is well-known that the designing and use of 'symbols' ( )-as talismans are sometimes called in Chineseand other forms of divine ( ) writing as well preceded Taoism, and continued to exist outside of it, particularly in Buddhism. Of particular interest are the recurrent allegation of 'deluding' or 'deceiving' the people, which was tantamount to an accusation of public order disruption and thereby legitimated immediate repression, and such formulae as unorthodox ( , literally 'wasteful') cults, 'sinister way', 'deviant magic' and 'deviant arts', which would conveniently stigmatise any occult practice or cultic activity not recognised by the state-or by institutionalised Taoism and Buddhism themselves.
79 Similar discourse served comparable needs during later ages of Chinese history up the contemporary era-an example in point is the Falun Gong movement-as well as in the context of other cultural areas: for instance, in late Western antiquity, the concept of 'magic' arose from debates on the correctness of religious practice which, really, discussed 'the appropriate wielding of power'.
Last, let us consider some of the titles claimed by our 'deviants'. Two of them-'General of Great Peace' (case 1) and 'August Emperor of Great Peace' (case 7)-include the compound ('Great Peace'), which we have just encountered in the context of Taoist eschatology. At the time, it was a potent concept already with a long history, but this eschatological layer constituted only a secondary and comparably late development. 81 were derived from notions of Taoist eschatology-or, for that matter, that they pointed to ideas from the eponymous scripture preserved in the mid-Ming dynasty (1368-1644) Taoist Canon, the notorious but still poorly understood (Taiping jing ). 82 And if the English renderings 'Saintly King', 'Saintly Ruler' and 'Saintly Lord' translate as 'theocracy' in the mind of those scholars who 'believe they see intensity everywhere', as Veyne would put it, it should be underlined that all three titles were primarily, and they remained so throughout the Chinese imperial era, terms of both idealised reference or respectful address to the sovereign. 83 These titles in turn allow us to grasp directly, without the mediation of interpretative speculation, the logic at work behind the historiographical anecdotes. Most of the 'deviants' therein have in common an illegitimate claim to authority, and/or the unauthorised appointment of functionaries, and/or the inauguration of an illicit regnal era and/or the production of 84 We are back to high treason and the legitimacy of power, as the late second-and early third-century cases of Dai Yi and Zhang Lu made clear. In sum, the purpose of the historiography of local resistance was not to provide an ethnographical account of the 'religious' traits of some social phenomena observed or to report how supposedly 'theocratic' outbursts were repressed, but to chronicle how legitimate authority reacted to disruptions of public order. As Paul Pelliot (1878 Pelliot ( -1945 wrote about the Jesuits Matteo Ricci a great deal of curious things and did not trouble public order, they were tolerated, and even sought after'. 85 Despite the huge diachronic gap and all public order in mind and cared little for theology, dogma or orthopraxis, beyond those of the state he served.
Epilogue: Academic Resistance Today
History and all of its facets, including religious history, should be written by academics who are fully aware of the existence of a science called history and relying on its methodology, rather than by those engaged in 83 Indeed was used profusely in Taoist and Buddhist discourse. For instance, in the Buddhist Canon, there are thousands of occurrences of the compound 'Saintly Way' (mentioned in the third Li Hong anecdote above) in self-reference to Buddhism. 84 We lack such pieces of information solely in the case of the second, fourth and seventh Li Hong, for which the available historical data remain scarce. All three of them, however, are equally called 'deviant bandits' in the relevant historiographical sources. 85 Pelliot, Comme ils savaient une foule de choses curieuses et ne troublaient pas l'ordre public, on les toléra, on les rechercha même.') De Groot's essay appeared in a crusade to implement retrospectively some 'politically correct' trends seem in view of the central part that value judgements play in individual life experience. In the current context of what has come to be called 'fast science' and generalised competition for instant respectability and newly admitted doctors anxious to get a stable, paid position-are under constant pressure to publish and soon or later end up giving priority to the habits borrowed from other socio-professional milieus have appeared, such as laying an overemphasis on virtually any data regardless of its relative position within a given context-whether on book covers, in published papers or in research projects, any point in time becomes 'crucial', any phenomenon must have been 'underestimated' and any thus slowly gives way to the emotional language of news broadcasts and advertising, history is being insidiously replaced by storytelling. It is a well-known strategy of contemporary mainstream mass media covering any popular movement to continuously broadcast footage of the most violent action so as to convince public opinion of the radicality of the said movement. Similar ideological mechanisms are at work in the historiography of local resistance in early medieval China-indeed, all the anecdotes above, as recounted by medieval historiographers, are focused on aggressive action and often contain what would be called 'graphic violence' in the language of today's mass media. For all that, the phenomenology depicted above certainly did not boil down to mobs of sanguinary zealots; it more likely comprised a minority of conspicuous extremists or religious fanatics-not necessarily including the leaders themselves-together with a majority of half-hearted followers, all responding to a variety of motives of greatly varying 'intensity' and more or less clearly conceived of at the individual level. It should be and to maintain decent standards of intellectuality in their analyses and discourse. 'Truth' is not at stake, whether you spell it with an uppercase 't' or not-pragmatically, it is historicity that comes under threat, along with a basic respect for our audience and for ourselves.
